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Abstract
We examine episodes of fiscal adjustments in OECD countries from 2000 to 2014 and analyse its short- and
long-run impact on economic growth and inequality. This paper offers two results. First, in line with previous
literature, we find that in the short run, spending-based adjustments are more expansionary than tax-based
adjustments, although they are associated with higher inequality. Second, we find that in the long run,
spending-based adjustments are still more expansionary, and their impact on inequality is smaller than that of
tax-based adjustments.
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 1     Introduction 
The fiscal adjustments implemented in many countries since the financial crisis 
have become a major source of controversy. The governments responsible claim 
they were necessary to reduce the excessive budget deficits. In some cases they 
seem to be correlated with an increase in GDP growth. However, spending cuts 
and tax increases have had high social costs at the same time. Inequality has 
risen and youth unemployment has reached excessive levels in countries like 
Italy or Spain.  
The debate about the effects fiscal adjustments is broad and encompasses 
many different areas. In this paper we attempt to focus on periods where 
governments have implemented measures of fiscal consolidation in recent years. 
Our goal is to analyse the effects of these policies in two areas at the centre of 
the debate: economic growth and inequality. We look at the different impact if 
they are mostly implemented through tax increases or spending cuts. We do not 
aim to make a point for austerity measures being implemented or not in response 
to economic distress.  
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the most 
relevant literature regarding this area. Section 3 examines the data and 
methodology, and defines different kinds of fiscal adjustments.  Section 4 
presents empirical analysis on the short- and long-term effect of the composition 
of fiscal adjustments on growth and inequality. Section 5 presents further 
evidence of the results. The last section concludes. 
 
2     Literature review 
This paper is related to two different lines of literature. The first is the literature 
on the impact and composition of fiscal adjustments. Early studies on the 
potential expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations were carried out by 
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 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1996). They use country-specific case studies 
and cross-country evidence to show how fiscal consolidations can be associated 
with “non-Keynesian” expansionary effects (Feldstein, 1982). The first paper to 
analyse the composition of large fiscal adjustments is Alesina and Perotti 
(1995). In line with further evidence by the IMF (1996), they argue that 
spending-based fiscal adjustments are more effective in stabilising debt to GDP 
ratios and can have more expansionary effects than tax-based adjustments.  
Several studies by Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010 and 2012) expand 
those analyses and share most of the previous conclusions. Most of the studies 
prior to 2010 use the cyclically adjusted primary balance as the main measure 
of fiscal consolidations, as proposed by Blanchard (1993). Romer and Romer 
(2010) propose a new “narrative” approach that involves a case-by-case analysis 
of each fiscal consolidation episode. Studies using this approach include the 
IMF (2011) and Alesina et al. (2014). The evidence of these studies suggests no 
change in overall conclusions. 
The second line of literature englobes the studies relating episodes of fiscal 
adjustments to changes in inequality of income, suggesting a potential trade-off 
between growth and inequality. The existence of this trade-off was accepted in 
the early 20th century (Boix, 1996), until the rise of Keynesian economics, when 
new sets of policies that were positive for both inequality and growth were 
proposed.  
Mulas-Granados (2003) argues that the neoclassical paradigm came back 
to dominance in the 70s.  Mulas-Granados (2005) first studied the potential 
short-run trade-off between growth and inequality. He shows that in the short 
term, spending-based adjustments can be more expansionary than tax-based 
adjustments but at the same time lead to higher inequality. Similarly, tax-based 
adjustments are less expansionary (or contractionary) but increase inequality by 
less. 
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 The modern empirical literature on this subject is quite limited, although it 
has been expanded in the past few years.  Recent evidence suggesting that 
spending cuts lead to more inequality than tax increases has been developed by 
Agnello and Sousa (2012) and Woo et al. (2013). The Gini coefficient is broadly 
used to measure inequality in these studies.  Ball et al. (2013) use the “narrative” 
approach to identify fiscal consolidations and reach similar conclusions. All of 
these studies focus on the short-run impact.  
Overall, past literature suggests that in the short run spending-based 
adjustments lead to more economic growth but are also more harmful for 
inequality than tax-based adjustments, therefore creating a trade-off. This paper 
focuses on (i) analysing whether this trade-off holds for our sample and (ii) 
investigating whether it holds in the long term. 
 
3     Data, definitions and methodology 
3.1   Data 
The growth data spans 30 OECD countries in the years 2000 to 2014. The 
inequality data is more restricted, spanning 28 OECD countries over the years 
2000 to 2012. Further information about countries, time periods, definitions of 
variables and sources is included in the appendix. To measure economic growth 
we use the logarithm of real GDP per capita to normalise the data, as per 
previous literature. The main measure of inequality used is the Gini coefficient 
multiplied by 100, also consistent with previous studies. 
3.2   Definitions of fiscal adjustments 
In order to measure the impact of fiscal adjustments we use the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as the measure of the government’s fiscal 
stance. The data from the “narrative” method mentioned previously is limited 
and not available for this analysis. CAPB is calculated by subtracting the effects 
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 of business cycle fluctuations from the primary budget balance, as calculated by 
the OECD. The main assumption is that once the primary balance is adjusted 
for business cycles, most of its fluctuations come from policy changes. 
Therefore, an increase in the CAPB would indicate a fiscal adjustment.  
CAPB is used to measure fiscal consolidations in several studies, such as 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998, and 2012). However, it is not a perfect measure and 
can lead to biased results (Romer and Romer, 2010). CAPB may account for 
non-policy factors which are correlated with exogenous variables affecting 
inequality or growth. For example, a boom in the stock market leads to higher 
earnings and therefore higher tax revenues. This shows as an improvement in 
CAPB although not being in response to fiscal adjustments. Moreover, this is 
likely to affect other variables, for example higher consumption and investment. 
Therefore, the correlation between an increase in CAPB and the error term is 
likely to be positive. This can lead to an upwards biased estimate (IMF, 2011). 
CAPB may also suffer from measurement error if it omits periods during which 
fiscal adjustments were accompanied by offsetting adverse shocks.  
In order to deal with part of this issue we will restrict the definition of fiscal 
adjustment to periods where the reduction can be considered too big to be 
“business as usual”. Past literature used definitions to consider only periods of 
fiscal adjustments where the reduction was in the range of 1-2 per cent. We 
adopt the following definitions: 
Definition 1. A period of fiscal consolidation is a year when the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by 1% or more.  
This allows us to ignore all periods where the change in CAPB is likely to 
be due to exogenous changes in other variables instead of policy changes. We 
do not aim to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary policies, 
and assume firms and households react to both in a similar way.  
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 Definition 2. A tax-based fiscal adjustment is a period where CAPB improves 
by 1% or more and government revenues as % of GDP increase by 0.5% or 
more. 
When estimating tax-based fiscal adjustments in the baseline equation we 
include Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as a control variable. GFCF 
measures the value of net investment in fixed assets in an economy. This way 
we control for improvements in economic activity that could be biasing upwards 
part of the estimates.  
Definition 3. A spending-based fiscal adjustment is a period where CAPB 
improves by 1% or more and government spending as % of GDP decreases by 
0.5% or more. 
When estimating spending-based adjustments in the main model we will 
include as a control variable the percentage of people who are not in the age of 
working. This way we control for changes in spending that need to be carried 
out as a response to demographic changes, and may be biasing the results. 
Other variables included in all the baseline specifications are the exchange 
rate in the same period (controlling for currency fluctuations) and the short-term 
interest rate (controlling for changes in monetary policy). The log of per-capita 
GDP and its squared term are also included in regressions on inequality (see 
Barro, 2008).  
3.3   Methodology 
In order to measure the effects of fiscal consolidations on growth and inequality 
we use the following baseline specification model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
2
𝑗=1
∑ 𝛽𝑠𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 +
3
𝑠=1
∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑿𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑘=1
 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
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 where subscripts i and t index countries and years, Y is the dependent variable, 
CAPB is equal to one in periods of fiscal adjustments (as previously defined) 
and zero otherwise, and X’ is a vector of control variables (see previous section). 
The error term µ contains country-specific fixed effects 𝜆. Equation (1) is 
estimated over the sample by difference GMM (Arellano-Bond). 
It is assumed that both real GDP and the Gini coefficient are dynamic 
variables, that is, they depend on their own past realizations. Following past 
analyses (Agnello and Sousa, 2012, Alesina et al, 2015) we assume a linear 
functional relationship across time. The last assumption of this model is non-
contemporaneity: due to long transmission mechanisms and fiscal policy lags, 
we assume changes in the CAPB take at least one period to have an impact on 
the dependent variables. This implies current decisions are based on past 
outcomes. Therefore, we will focus on analysing the impact on adaptive 
expectations rather than rational expectations.  
The aim of this study is to measure the short and long-run impact of a 1 
percentage point change in CAPB on growth and inequality. Results are 
presented for the estimated cumulate responses on changes in CAPB at periods 
t+1, t+2, t+3 and the long-run effect. Robust standard errors of the impulse 
responses are calculated via the delta method (Alesina and Ardagna, 2012). 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for periods of spending- and tax-based 
fiscal consolidations (as per the previous definitions). Finally, the various 
specifications are estimated with other proxies for inequality and different 
control variables to ensure the main results are consistent and sound. 
Several estimation problems may arise from equation (1). In a dynamic 
model, lags of the dependent variable will be correlated with the error term, 
which is a source of bias and autocorrelation. While by assuming non-
contemporaneity the potential endogeneity problem from reverse causality is 
eliminated, independent variables are not likely to be strictly exogenous either. 
For instance, changes in CAPB are likely to be correlated with past realizations 
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 of the error (IMF, 2011). Fixed effects contained in the error term may be 
correlated with other endogenous variables too. Thus, OLS estimation would 
yield biased results. 
Difference GMM (Arellano-Bond) uses first-differences to transform 
equation (1) into 
∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
2
𝑗=1
∑ 𝛽𝑠∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 +
3
𝑠=1
∑ 𝛾𝑘∆𝑿𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑘=1
 
and 
∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝜆𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
or 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 = (𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖) + (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1) 
therefore removing fixed effects.  
However, all variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are still 
endogenous because, for instance, the term 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 in ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 is 
correlated with the term µ𝑖,𝑡 in ∆µ𝑖,𝑡 = µ𝑖,𝑡 − µ𝑖,𝑡−1. Deeper lags can be used as 
instruments since they are correlated with the previous lag but not with the error. 
For instance, ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 are related to ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 but not to 
the error term ∆µ𝑖,𝑡 = µ𝑖,𝑡 − µ𝑖,𝑡−1. 
Instruments can be assumed valid unless the errors are serially correlated 
(Roodman, 2006). Since ∆µ𝑖,𝑡 is related to ∆µ𝑖,𝑡−1 because of the shared µ𝑖,𝑡−1 
term, negative first order serial correlation is likely to appear in the first 
differenced residuals. Therefore it is only required that there is no second order 
serial correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Tests for second order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals are reported in all regressions, 
as well as Sargan tests for the joint validity of instruments. 
(2) 
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 4     Results 
We study whether spending-based adjustments increase both economic growth 
and inequality by more than tax-based adjustments, therefore creating a trade-
off. We compare the findings in the short and long term. Table 1 shows the 
cumulated effect of a 1% improvement in CAPB on real GDP (columns 1-3) 
and the Gini coefficient (columns 4-6) after one, two and three years, and the 
long-run effect. Results are broken down into (i) all adjustments, (ii) spending-
based adjustments and (iii) tax-based adjustments.   
 
4.1   Growth 
Estimates in columns 1-3 show that fiscal consolidations have a statistically 
significant expansionary effect on GDP both in the short and long run. This adds 
evidence to the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal adjustments as initially 
proposed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). On average, a 1% fiscal adjustment 
is associated with an increase in GDP of 0.2-0.3 percent within three years and 
1.1-1.6 percent in the long term. The magnitude of these results is similar to 
previous literature, including Mulas-Granados (2005) and Alesina and Ardagna 
(2012). 
The long-run results suggest the effect of fiscal consolidations is persistent 
across time. This points to supply-side effects being the major driver of the 
impact, since they are more likely to be structural and have a higher long-term 
impact than demand-side effects. Moreover, since this model is based on 
adaptive expectations, it is not likely to capture demand-side effects relying on 
rational expectations. Structural reforms that may accompany fiscal adjustments 
are improvements in business capacity constraints and labour market reforms. 
Its effects are likely to be persistent and take place in the medium term 
(Summers, 2012).  
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 Log of real GDP per capita  Gini coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based    All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  
        
∆CAPB – t+1 0.184*** 0.268*** 0.178  0.112 0.239** 0.069 
 (0.062) (0.101) (0.115)  (0.070) (0.103) (0.049) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.204** 0.348*** 0.198  0.080 0.147*** 0.139** 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0. 161)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.062) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.218 0.293** 0.310**  0.149*** -0.006 0.311*** 
 (0.139) (0.129) (0.125)  (0.034) (0.054) (0.078) 
∆CAPB – Long term 1.171 1.590** 1.119*  0.417*** 0.381*** 0.613** 
 (0.736) (0.803) (0.574)  (0.130) (0.142) (0.243) 
        
Sargan test 0.000 0.000 0.002  0.023 0.440 0.304 
AR(2) 0.055 0.501 0.452  0.958 0.100 0.092 
Observations 330 119 118  139 48 47 
 
Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: logarithm of real GDP in columns 1-3; Gini coefficient in columns 4-6. Control variables Log of real GDP per capita: exchange rate, first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population 
not in the age of working (all and spending-based adjustments), and grossed fixed capital formation (all and tax-based adjustments). Control variables Gini coefficient: real GDP per capita, real GDP 
per capita squared, exchange rate, and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, average growth of G7 countries, population not in the age of working (all and spending-based adjustments), and 
grossed fixed capital formation (all and tax-based adjustments). Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 1. The effects of fiscal adjustments on real per capita GDP growth and Gini coefficients 
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 The overall direction of these effects is invariant if they are divided between 
spending- and tax-based adjustments (columns 2 and 3). However, spending-based 
adjustments have a higher expansionary effect than tax-based adjustments in most 
periods, with peak effects of 1.590 percent and 1.119 percent respectively in the long run. 
Therefore, results suggest that fiscal multipliers are negative, and are greater (in absolute 
terms) for spending-based consolidations than for tax-based consolidations. Several 
studies including Alesina et al. (2014) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012) support this 
evidence. We now analyse potential reasons for this effect. 
Regarding spending-based adjustments, Guajardo et al. (2011) argue that this may 
be due to monetary easing accompanying large spending cuts. Yet, as previously 
mentioned, monetary policy is included as a control variable in the above regression. Lane 
and Perotti (1996), argue that a reduction in government employment and wages weakens 
the power of unions. It reduces labour demand and wages demanded by workers, and can 
increase long-term profitability and investment. This may be accounting for part of the 
long run expansionary effect captured in the results. 
On the other hand, tax-based fiscal consolidations seem to have smaller effects on 
output. Romer and Romer (2010) show that permanent tax increases reduce general 
investment and consumption, mainly on durable goods. Moreover, increases in income 
taxes decrease post-tax real wages (Alesina and Ardagna, 1997). In unionized imperfectly 
competitive labour markets, which is the case in OECD countries (Blanchflower, 1996), 
unions demand higher pre-tax real wages to reflect the higher taxes. This may harm 
competitiveness and investment, and decrease output growth. Therefore, this suggests the 
labour market effect from tax-based consolidations will be smaller in the long run.  
4.2   Inequality 
Estimates suggest that an improvement of 1% in CAPB increases inequality in all periods 
(column 4), with an overall impact of 0.417 on the long-run Gini coefficient. 
Comparing between spending- and tax-based adjustments (columns 5 and 6), it can be 
observed how this effect varies across time, but always points to increases in inequality. 
Analysing the short-run results, particularly after two periods, spending-based 
adjustments seem to be more harmful than tax-based adjustments. Point estimates for the 
short-run effect on inequality of spending and tax-based consolidations are 0.147 and 
0.139, respectively, both statistically significant. This is in line with the hypothesis of a 
10
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 short-term trade-off between growth and inequality. Both the direction and magnitude are 
consistent with results by Agnello and Sousa (2012) and Ball et al. (2013).  
Long-run estimates suggest that spending-based adjustments have a smaller impact 
on inequality than tax-based adjustments. The estimates are 0.381 and 0.613 respectively, 
both highly significant. Therefore, this suggests that in the long run spending-based 
adjustments increase inequality by less than tax-based adjustments. The short-run trade-
off between growth and inequality seems to disappear in the long run. This expands the 
scope of the previous literature, and points to the existence of different medium and long-
term dynamics in the effects of tax increases and spending cuts.  
To expand our results, in tables 2 and 3 we regress the baseline model on the share 
of income held by each quintile in society. We control for monetary policy, the percentage 
of population not in the age of working, the exchange rate, and the log of per-capita GDP 
and its squared term. Results show that increases in CAPB raise the income share of the 
top 20% while decreasing the income share of the rest (Table 2). The result is the same 
regardless of the design of the fiscal adjustment (Table 3).  
The statistically significant short-term results (period 2 for the first and third 
quintiles, and period 1 for the second quintile) suggest that spending-based adjustments 
increase the income share of the top 20% by more and decrease the income share of the 
rest by more than tax-based adjustments. This adds evidence to the short-run trade-off 
between inequality and growth.  
However, the long-term results suggest that spending-based adjustments increase the 
income share of the top 20% by less and decrease the income share of the rest by less than 
tax-based adjustments. This adds further evidence to the existence of different medium 
and long-term dynamics in the impact of tax increases and spending cuts that eliminate 
the short-run trade-off. We now turn to investigate channels that explain this result. 
We start by analysing the effects of spending-based adjustments. The OECD (2012) 
argues that cuts in social transfers lead to effective fiscal consolidations, since they create 
disincentives to work. Social transfers are mainly directed towards lower-income groups 
such as the unemployed and the disabled. These groups rely on such transfers as their 
11
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita squared, and first and 
second lags of short-term interest rate, exchange rate and population not in the age of working. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 Share of Income per quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
      
∆CAPB – t+1 0.134*** -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.026** -0.023 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.095*** -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.002 
 (0.030) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.139*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.020* -0.031** 
 (0.041) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
∆CAPB – Long term 0.425*** -0.135*** -0.145*** -0.080*** -0.069*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) 
      
Sargan test 0.009 0.019 0.024 0.067 0.264 
AR(2) 0.473 0.539 0.201 0.639 0.811 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 
Table 2. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (all adjustments) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, and 14-15, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita squared, 
and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, exchange rate and population not in the age of working. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Share of income per quintile 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 First 
Spending-
based 
First 
Tax-based 
Second 
Spending-
based 
Second 
Tax-based 
Third 
Spending-
based 
Third 
Tax-based 
Fourth 
Spending-
based 
Fourth 
Tax-based 
Fifth 
Spending-
based 
Fifth 
Tax-based 
           
∆CAPB – t+1 0.118* 0.067 -0.041* -0.012*** -0.037 -0.033** -0.013 -0.026** -0.026 0.004 
 (0.068) (0.041) (0.021) (0.011) (0.026) (0.016) (0.023) (0.009) (0.035) (0.011) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.092*** 0.048* -0.016 -0.008 -0.044** -0.021*** -0.019 -0.017* -0.020 -0.002 
 (0.035) (0.026) (0. 013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0. 022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.012) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.018 0.183*** -0.006 -0.065*** -0.013 -0.060** -0.020 -0.027 0.016 -0.025 
 (0.91) (0.068) (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.231** 0.276*** -0.063* -0.075*** -0.092** -0.097*** -0.054 -0.059** -0.031 -0.023 
 (0.092) (0.095) (0.033) (0.023) (0.038) (0.029) (0.034) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033) 
           
Sargan test 0.427 0.369 0.397 0.310 0.472 0.487 0.695 0.563 0.872 0.660 
AR(2) 0.092 0.657 0.074 0.688 0.063 0.098 0.881 0.500 0.430 0.047 
Observations 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 
Table 3. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (by composition) 
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 primary source of income. Cuts in those areas will therefore increase inequality, as the 
higher-income groups are unaffected. Regarding the long-terms gains in incentives and 
productivity claimed by the OECD (2012), they could potentially be influencing the 
relative decrease in the long-term impact of spending cuts compared to tax increases.  
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Moral-Benito (2012) show that cuts in public sector 
wages are one of the main areas where governments decrease expenditures when carrying 
out fiscal adjustments.  Jenkins et al. (2011) show that the share of wages in the incomes 
of lower-income groups is significantly higher than in the rest of groups. Therefore, wage 
decreases are likely to increase inequality in the short run, as these groups will see their 
main source of income decrease while the effect on other groups’ income will be 
relatively smaller. We previously suggested that as proposed by Lane and Perotti (1996), 
decreases in public wages can create expansionary effects in the long run. If this leads to 
a reduction in unemployment, then the long-term impact of spending cuts on inequality 
may be smaller.  
We now turn to the effects of tax-based adjustments. The IMF (1996) shows earning 
and corporate taxes have longer lags, so their biggest impact on inequality is felt in the 
long term, as reflected in the results. Multiple studies including the OECD (2012) argue 
that regressive taxes such as VAT have a much bigger impact on inequality than income 
and corporate taxes. Since such types of taxes are paid equally by everyone regardless of 
their wealth or income, the relative effect over an individual’s income is higher in lower-
income groups.  
Corporate taxes can also be considered as a source of inequality. As argued by 
Kotlikoff (2011), higher corporate taxes can lead to firm relocation and investment fleeing 
to look for higher returns. This may create unemployment and leave the workers bearing 
the tax increase, instead of corporations. Increases in inequality from this rise in 
unemployment would be felt in the medium and long run given the time it takes for firms 
to relocate. Taxes on earnings are progressive so they tend to have a lower negative effect 
on inequality than regressive taxes (Woo et al. 2012).  
Overall, our results show that in the short run, spending-based adjustments lead to 
higher growth and higher inequality than tax-based adjustments. This is in line with the 
short run trade-off proposed by Mulas-Granados (2005). Results also suggest that this 
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 trade-off disappears in the long-run. Estimates for the long-run effect suggest spending-
based adjustments lead to higher growth and lower inequality than tax-based adjustments. 
 
5     Robustness checks 
In this section we study alternative specifications in order to check the robustness of the 
previous analysis. Tables with results are included in the appendix (tables 4-11). 
5.1   Growth 
In table 4 we add extra control variables to the GDP regressions, namely private 
consumption, exchange rate fluctuations in the same period and a year trend (columns 1-
3). Results are consistent with our previous estimates. Adding the average growth of the 
G7 countries instead of private consumption (columns 4-6), tax increases become more 
expansionary than spending cuts in the long run, but results are not statistically 
significant.  
Next, we modify the baseline equation to include the same independent variables in 
the equations for both spending cuts and tax increases, together with a year trend 
(Columns 7-9). Most results are significant and suggest spending cuts are more 
expansionary than tax increases in all periods except period 3. 
Finally, in table 5, we include different sets of control variables than in the baseline 
specification. In columns 10-12, we control for exchange rate fluctuations in the same 
period, the long-term government yield and a year trend. All results are smaller than in 
previous specifications. There is no statistically significant evidence that spending cuts 
are more expansionary than tax increases in the short run. In columns 13-15 we control 
for exchange rate fluctuations in the same period and government debt as a percentage of 
GDP. The magnitude of this results is similar to the initial one, and overall estimates are 
broadly consistent with previous analysis. 
5.2   Inequality 
In tables 6 and 7 we analyse the robustness of the results on the Gini coefficient. In 
columns 1-3 we include a time trend. In columns 4-6 we also include additional control 
variables, namely the unemployment rate and private consumption. Results are consistent 
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 with the previous estimates. Tax increases seem to be less harmful in the short run when 
estimates are statistically significant, but more harmful in the long run. 
Moreover, we analyse the baseline regression using the same independent variables 
for both tax increases and spending cuts, and include a time trend. Results are presented 
in columns 7-9. Estimates are still consistent with the previous analysis. As an alternative 
set of control variables we use the average growth of G7 countries and the unemployment 
rate (columns 10-12). This alters the results significantly. The long-run effects of overall, 
spending- and tax-based consolidations drop from 0.417, 0.381 and 0.613 in the initial 
estimation to 0.379, 0.271 and 0.347, respectively. However, the relative impact of 
spending and tax-based adjustments in the short and long run is unchanged. 
Alternative specifications for the regressions on the income share held by each 
quintile of the population are presented in tables 8-9 and 10-11. In tables 8-9 we include 
a year trend instead of exchange rate fluctuations. In tables 10-11 we include a year trend, 
the average growth of G7 countries and gross fixed capital formation, instead of short-
term interest rates and the percentage of population not in the age of working. Both 
estimations yield similar results to the ones previously obtained.  
 
6     Concluding remarks 
6.1   Conclusion 
In recent years there has been a lively debate about the positive and negative impacts of 
austerity measures. In this paper we have studied the different impact that fiscal 
adjustments have on inequality and growth according to their composition. Results 
suggest there is a short-term trade-off between growth and inequality when implementing 
fiscal adjustments: in the short run, spending-based adjustments increase economic 
growth by more than tax-based adjustments, but increase inequality by more as well. 
However, results suggest that in the long run this trade-off disappears. Long-run estimates 
suggest that spending-based adjustments are more expansionary and increase inequality 
by less than tax-based adjustments. This expands on previous literature and suggests the 
existence of different medium-term dynamics in the impacts of fiscal policy.  
16
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 12 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 18
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/18
 While this analysis provides an argument for spending- rather than tax-based 
adjustments, it focuses on overall effects. Therefore, policy implications cannot be drawn 
without previously studying the specific areas where spending cuts and tax increases are 
implemented. For example, spending cuts in disability benefits are likely to have a greater 
impact on inequality than any tax increase. Similarly, since higher levels of income tend 
to save more, taxing those savings in not likely to be as harmful for growth as VAT 
increases. Further analysis should focus on providing more detailed estimates on which 
kinds of spending cuts and tax increases lead to better and worse outcomes.  
6.2   Limitations 
The main limitations of this analysis are the small number of observations and our 
measure of fiscal adjustments. A larger dataset and the use of the “narrative” approach to 
calculating fiscal adjustments could improve the evidence presented. All regressions pass 
the test for second order serial correlation or can only be rejected at the 10% level. Sargan 
tests reject the joint validity of instruments in some occasions, meaning that the lags of 
some variables used as instruments are correlated with the error term. This was expected 
since both GDP and inequality measures are affected by a large amount of factors that 
appear in the error term. As pointed out previously, the results of this analysis may have 
an upward bias. However, this is less relevant when analysing the relative effect between 
tax and spending adjustments, assuming the magnitude and direction is the same for both. 
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 Data appendix 
Variables definitions and sources 
 Economic growth = logarithm of real per capita GDP (World Bank) 
 Gini coefficient = measures the deviation from a perfectly equal distribution of 
the distribution of after tax income (World Bank) 
 Share of income per quintile = share income that accrues to subgroups of 
population indicated by quintiles (World Bank) 
 Cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) = cyclically adjusted primary 
deficit as a share of GDP (OECD) 
 Government revenue = general government total receipts, as % of GDP (OECD) 
 Government spending = total disbursements of general government, as a 
percentage of GDP (OECD) 
 Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) = additions to the fixed assets of the 
economy plus net changes in the level of inventories (World Bank) 
 Population not in the age of working = population older than 65 or younger than 
15, as a % of total population (OCED) 
 Exchange rate = national currency per USD (OECD) 
 Short-term interest rate = short-term interest rate set by the central bank (OECD) 
 Private consumption = value of goods and services acquired and consumed by 
households, as a % of GDP (OECD) 
 Government debt = government gross financial liabilities, as % of GDP (OECD) 
 G7 growth = average per capita growth of G7 economies (OECD) 
 Unemployment rate = number of unemployed individuals as a % of the labour 
force (OECD) 
Sample country list1 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands*, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic*, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
                                                          
1 * indicates no data for Gini coefficients 
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Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Observations 
      
∆Economic growth 1.282 2.911 -15.735 10.367 420 
      
∆Gini coefficient -0.117 1.154 -6.520 4.090 190 
      
∆Share of income of the 1st 
quintile 
-0.120 0.937 -4.840 2.840 190 
      
∆Share of income of the 2nd 
quintile 
0.036 0.304 -1.010 1.890 190 
      
∆Share of income of the 3rd 
quintile 
0.048 0.297 -1.050 1.260 190 
      
∆Share of income of the 4th 
quintile 
0.039 0.303 -0.830 1.680 190 
      
∆Share of income of the 5th 
quintile 
-0.003 0.377 -2.070 1.680 190 
      
∆CAPB -0.003 2.439 -17.824 17.898 420 
      
∆Government revenue 0.049 1.157 -4.200 6.722 420 
      
∆Government spending 0.210 2.589 -20.167 18.474 420 
      
∆GFCF -0.265 1.948 -11.120 6.783 417 
      
∆ Population not in the age 
of working 
0.367 -0.333 -0.232 1.557 420 
      
∆Exchange rate -0.299 18.363 -120.971 174.085 420 
      
∆Short-term interest rate -0.382 1.290 -6.943 3.084 420 
      
∆Private consumption -0.003 0.009 -0.047 0.048 420 
      
∆Government debt 2.263 6.581 -17.378 54.994 420 
      
∆G7 growth -0.172 2.375 -4.028 6.985 420 
      
∆Unemployment rate 0.093 1.246 -4.295 7.917 420 
      
Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent variables: 
logarithm of real GDP in all columns. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Set of control variables 1 includes: Time trend, exchange rate, and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age of working (all and spending-based adjustments), grossed fixed capital 
formation (all and tax-based adjustments) and private consumption as % of GDP. 
Set of control variables 2 includes: Time trend, exchange rate, and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age of working (all and spending-based adjustments), grossed fixed capital 
formation (all and tax-based adjustments) and average growth of G7 countries. 
Set of control variables 3 includes: Time trend, exchange rate, and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age of working, grossed fixed capital formation. 
 Log of real GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All 
Adjustments 
Spending-
Based  
Tax-Based  All 
Adjustments 
Spending-
Based  
Tax-Based  All 
Adjustments 
Spending-
Based  
 
Tax-Based  
          
∆CAPB – t+1 0.188*** 0.224*** 0.112 0.165*** 0.171** 0.140 0.183*** 0.269*** 0.181* 
 (0.063) (0.008) (0.101) (0.062) (0.076) (0.109) (0.063) (0.089) (0.104) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.213** 0.254*** 0.138 0.182* 0.176** 0.139 0.203* 0.302*** 0.191 
 (0.107) (0.087) (0.157) (0.102) (0.071) (0.152) (0.104) (0.094) (0.147) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.238 0.189** 0.252 0.187 0.158* 0.219 0.217 0.231** 0.284* 
 (0.152) (0.090) (0.176) (0.139) (0.083) (0.173) (0.143) (0.103) (0.160) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 1.373* 0.774*** 0.757 1.013 0.595** 0.878 1.206 1.173** 0.977* 
 (0.796) (0.293) (0.533) (0.733) (0.238) (0.698) (0.763) (0.481) (0.561) 
          
Set of control variables 1          
          
Set of control variables 2          
          
Set of control variables 3          
          
Sargan test 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.006 
AR(2) 0.011 0.941 0.541 0.053 0.623 0.541 0.037 0.677 0.450 
Observations 328 119 118 328 119 118 328 119 118 
Table 4. The effects of fiscal adjustments on real per capita GDP growth for different sets of variables (a) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: logarithm of real GDP in all columns. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Set of control variables 4 includes: Time trend, exchange rate, and first and second lags of long-term government yield. 
Set of control variables 5 includes: Exchange rate and first and second lags of government debt.
 Log of real GDP per capita 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  
 
       
∆CAPB – t+1 0.129** 0.240*** 0.161 0.227*** 0.334*** 0.277** 
 (0.053) (0.087) (0.105) (0.047) (0.122) (0.127) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.109 0.226*** 0.232* 0.324*** 0.407** 0.409** 
 (0.075) (0.070) (0.128) (0.067) (0.182) (0.192) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.084 0.204** 0.143 0.350*** 0.326 0.369* 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.135) (0.090) (0.205) (0.212) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.459 0.760*** 0.599 1.805*** 1.760 1.693* 
 (0.407) (0.270) (0.384) (0.460) (1.415) (0.982) 
       
Set of control variables 4       
       
Set of control variables 5       
       
Sargan test 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.005 0.661 0.629 0.007 0.610 0.752 
Observations 328 119 118 328 119 118 
Table 5. The effects of fiscal adjustments on real per capita GDP growth for different sets of variables (b) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. 
Dependent variables: Gini coefficient in all columns. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Set of control variables 1 includes: Logarithm of real GDP, Logarithm of real GDP squared, exchange rate, time trend and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age 
of working (all and spending-based adjustments), grossed fixed capital formation (all and tax-based adjustments) and average growth of G7 countries.  
Set of control variables 2 includes: Logarithm of real GDP, Logarithm of real GDP squared, exchange rate, time trend and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age 
of working (all and spending-based adjustments), grossed fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP (all and tax-based adjustments), average growth of G7 countries, unemployment rate and 
private consumption as percentage of GDP. 
 
 Gini coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  
 
       
∆CAPB – t+1 0.121* 0.240*** 0.067 0.137* 0.254** 0.080* 
 (0.072) (0.092) (0.045) (0.070) (0.101) (0.044) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.085* 0.147*** 0.135** 0.101** 0.070 0.143*** 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.044) (0.060) (0.051) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.125*** -0.028 0.299*** 0.135*** -0.046 0.239*** 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.069) (0.035) (0.042) (0.081) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.381*** 0.360*** 0.637*** 0.422*** 0.278*** 0.452** 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.243) (0.112) (0.097) (0.200) 
       
Set of control variables 1       
       
Set of control variables 2       
       
Sargan test 0.026 0.584 0.352 0.021 0.583 0.378 
AR(2) 0.683 0.166 0.0531 0.601 0.278 0.092 
Observations 139 48 47 139 48 47 
Table 6. The effects of fiscal adjustments on Gini coefficients for different sets of variables (a) 
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Note: GMM estimationn using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: Gini coefficient in all columns. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Set of control variables 3 includes: Logarithm of real GDP, Logarithm of real GDP squared, exchange rate, time trend and first and second lags of short-term interest rate, population not in the age of 
working as % of total population, grossed fixed capital formation and average growth of G7 countries.  
Set of control variables 4 includes: Logarithm of real GDP, Logarithm of real GDP squared and first and second lags of average growth of G7 countries and unemployment rate. 
 
 
 
 Gini coefficient 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  All Adjustments Spending-Based  Tax-Based  
 
       
∆CAPB – t+1 0.121* 0.231*** 0.074 0.108** 0.124** 0.061 
 (0.072) (0.084) (0.046) (0.057) (0.058) (0.053) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.085* 0.173*** 0.135** 0.072* 0.125** 0.083*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.041) (0.053) (0.028) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.125*** -0.055 0.284*** 0.138*** 0.030 0.234*** 
 (0.031) (0.047) (0.071) (0.035) (0.045) (0.055) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.381*** 0.349*** 0.606** 0.379*** 0.271** 0.347*** 
 (0.124) (0.110) (0.238) (0.102) (0.125) (0.080) 
       
Set of control variables 3       
       
Set of control variables 4       
       
Sargan test 0.026 0.601 0.334 0.024 0.529 0.377 
AR(2) 0.683 0.155 0.064 0.904 0.133 0.118 
Observations 139 48 47 139 48 47 
Table 7. The effects of fiscal adjustments on Gini coefficients for different sets of variables (b) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita squared, year trend and 
first and second lags of short-term interest rate and population not in the age of working. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 Share of Income per quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
      
∆CAPB – t+1 0.125*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.025** -0.021 
 (0.045) (0.142) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.077** -0.023*** -0.037*** -0.031*** 0.000 
 (0.032) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.112*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.019** -0.024* 
 (0.030) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.342*** -0.109*** -0.121*** -0.079*** -0.056* 
 (0.080) (0.222) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) 
      
Sargan test 0.023 0.054 0.060 0.147 0.390 
AR(2) 0.561 0.474 0.096 0.551 0.648 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 
Table 8. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (all adjustments) for an alternative set of variables (a) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, and 14-15, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita squared, 
year trend and first and second lags of short-term interest rate and population not in the age of working. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 Share of income per quintile 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 First 
Spending-
based 
First 
Tax-based 
Second 
Spending-
based 
Second 
Tax-based 
Third 
Spending-
based 
Third 
Tax-based 
Fourth 
Spending-
based 
Fourth 
Tax-based 
Fifth 
Spending-
based 
Fifth 
Tax-based 
           
∆CAPB – t+1 0.125** 0.079* -0.044** -0.019 -0.042** -0.036** -0.016 -0.027** -0.030 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.045) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.011) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.121*** 0.043 -0.024* -0.003 -0.054*** -0.019** -0.031** -0.022*** -0.016 -0.001 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.001 0.183*** -0.001 -0.062*** -0.009 -0.057*** -0.017 -0.033** 0.017 -0.025 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.248** 0.287*** -0.070* -0.077*** -0.100*** -0.094*** -0.058** -0.067*** -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.102) (0.083) (0.036) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.042) (0.027) 
           
Sargan test 0.480 0.420 0.419 0.386 0.455 0.650 0.720 0.532 0.878 0.696 
AR(2) 0.201 0.645 0.193 0.019 0.249 0.720 0.976 0.389 0.410 0.048 
Observations 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 
Table 9. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (by composition) for an alternative set of variables (a) 
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Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. Dependent 
variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita squared, year trend and 
first and second lags average growth of G7 countries and gross fixed capital formation. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 Share of Income per quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
      
∆CAPB – t+1 0.104** -0.021 -0.035*** -0.024** -0.018 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.063** 0.013 -0.031*** -0.023** 0.004 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.117*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.021** -0.026 
 (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.324*** -0.087*** -0.114*** -0.069*** -0.050 
 (0.077) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.035) 
      
Sargan test 0.017 0.034 0.070 0.071 0.401 
AR(2) 0.600 0.369 0.078 0.297 0.179 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 
Table 10. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (all adjustments) for an alternative set of variables (b) 
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 Note: GMM estimation using Arellano-Bond. Table reports point estimates and delta method standard errors for cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation in t+1, t+2, t+3 and long run. 
Dependent variables: share of income held by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles in columns 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, and 14-15, respectively. Control variables: real GDP per capita real GDP per 
capita squared, year trend and first and second lags average growth of G7 countries and gross fixed capital formation. All specifications contain full set of country fixed effects. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Share of income per quintile 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 First 
Spending-
based 
First 
Tax-based 
Second 
Spending-
based 
Second 
Tax-based 
Third 
Spending-
based 
Third 
Tax-based 
Fourth 
Spending-
based 
Fourth 
Tax-based 
Fifth 
Spending-
based 
Fifth 
Tax-based 
           
∆CAPB – t+1 0.129** 0.101*** -0.042** -0.029** -0.042** -0.035*** -0.018 -0.011 -0.038** -0.018 
 (0.056) (0.036) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) 
∆CAPB – t+2 0.132*** 0.090*** -0.023* -0.031*** -0.055*** -0.026*** -0.024** 0.000 0.021 -0.028 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) 
∆CAPB – t+3 0.029 0.218*** -0.012 -0.082*** -0.014 -0.068*** -0.018 -0.022 0.008 -0.037** 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) 
∆CAPB –  Long term 0.286*** 0.376*** -0.078* -0.133*** -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.057* -0.027 -0.051 -0.084 
 (0.107) (0.072) (0.037) (0.024) (0.033) (0.019) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.056) 
           
Sargan test 0.483 0.459 0.441 0.420 0.348 0.635 0.548 0.604 0.720 0.709 
AR(2) 0.182 0.309 0.201 0.034 0.178 0.806 0.331 0.740 0.208 0.043 
Observations 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 48 46 
Table 11. The effects of fiscal adjustments on share of income held by each quintile of population (by composition) for an alternative set of variables (b) 
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